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Abstract 
We study the impact of home-biased public expenditure on international specialisation in 
general equilibrium models with increasing returns and monopolistic competition. It is found 
that home-biased procurement attracts increasing-returns industries to the home country (the 
“pull” effect) and attenuates the overall degree of industrial specialisation (the “spread” effect). 
Empirical evidence based on input-output data for the European Union confirms the existence 
of these links between public expenditure and the location of manufacturing activities. 
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4. Conclusions Non-Technical Summary 
We explore the consequences of home-biased government procurement on the patterns and the intensity 
of international specialisation. By “home bias” we refer to governments’ preference for domestic over 
foreign suppliers even if this practice implies that the budgetary cost of procurement might not be 
minimised. Discrimination by public purchasers in favour of local suppliers is a pervasive phenomenon, 
the motivations for which have been studied extensively. In this paper we investigate the consequences of 
home-biased procurement on the location of manufacturing activity. The theoretical analysis is based on 
models in the mould of the new theories of international trade and economic geography, and the empirical 
estimations draw on an input-output panel data set for EU countries over the 1970-1985 period. 
First, we study whether and how public expenditure affects the location of industries across countries in a 
model that incorporates a constant-returns perfectly competitive sector and an increasing-returns 
monopolistically competitive sector. For the monopolistically competitive sector, our analysis yields the 
prediction that, ceteris paribus, a country will tend to specialise in the good for which it has relatively large 
home-biased procurement. We call this the “pull effect”. Our empirical investigation supports this 
proposition. On average, an EU country with large government procurement on a good has tended to 
specialise in the production of that good. 
The second focus of this paper is on the intensity of industrial concentration, i.e. on the “how much” rather 
than the “where” of industrial agglomeration. To study this question we extend the model by incorporating 
dynamic agglomeration and dispersion forces. We find that home-biased public expenditure acts as a 
dispersion force: it reduces the likelihood that agglomeration forces prevail, and in the case where they 
prevail it reduces the intensity of industrial agglomeration. We call this the “spread effect”. Our data 
support the existence of a spread effect. Industries that are subject to a relatively large share of public 
expenditure tended to be less concentrated across EU countries. 
This study is purely positive in nature. Yet, our results may be informative for policy making, especially in 
the context of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement and of the EU’s ongoing effort to complete 
its single public procurement market. 
    
 
1. Introduction 
This study investigates the consequences of home-biased government procurement on the 
patterns and the intensity of international specialisation. By “home bias” we refer to 
governments’ preference for domestic over foreign suppliers even if this practice implies 
that the cost of procurement might not be minimised. Rather than asking about the causes 
of this pervasive phenomenon, we investigate its consequences on the location of 
manufacturing activities. 
First, we study whether and how public expenditure affects the location of industries across 
countries. For this purpose we extend the model of Helpman and Krugman (1985, Part III) 
to include home-biased public procurement. This model incorporates a constant-returns 
perfectly competitive sector and an increasing-returns monopolistically competitive sector. 
For the perfectly competitive sector our analysis confirms Baldwin’s (1984) neutrality 
proposition that government procurement is inconsequential for international specialisation. 
For the monopolistically competitive sector, our analysis instead yields the prediction that, 
ceteris paribus, a country will tend to specialise in the good for which it has relatively large 
home-biased procurement. Our empirical investigation based on input-output data for EU 
countries in 1970-85 supports this proposition: we find robust evidence of a “pull effect” of 
public expenditure on the location of manufacturing industries. 
Our second focus is on the intensity of industrial concentration, i.e. on the “how much” 
rather than the “where” of international specialisation. To study this question we extend the 
“new economic geography” model of Krugman and Venables (1995) to include home-
biased procurement. In this model, dispersion forces tend to prevail at high trade costs, and 
economic activity is spread evenly across countries; while agglomeration forces dominate 
at low trade costs, so that countries become specialised. We find that home-biased public 
expenditure, by acting as a dispersion force, reduces the likelihood that agglomeration 
forces prevail; and in the case that they prevail, public expenditure reduces the intensity of 
industrial agglomeration. An analysis of this link in our EU input-output dataset confirms 
the presence of such a “spread effect” of public expenditure on the location of 
manufacturing industries. 
Previous work on public procurement has followed two principal paths. A first line of 
research has studied the political interplay between the tendering entity and domestic and 
foreign bidders in various informational settings. This literature includes Branco (1994),    
 
McAfee and McMillan (1989), Vagstad (1995) and a general treatment by Laffont and 
Tirole (1993). The home bias in public procurement stems from the fact that profits of 
domestic firms enter the objective function of government while those of foreign firms do 
not. This literature is rooted in a partial-equilibrium approach and does not, therefore, 
provide the most appropriate framework for a study of international specialisation patterns. 
We depart from this line of research by taking the home bias as exogenous and focusing on 
the consequences of this practice on international specialisation in a general-equilibrium 
setting. 
Our study is closely related to a second line of inquiry on home-biased procurement, which, 
although initiated over 30 years ago, has remained relatively underexplored. This research 
programme links procurement to international specialisation and is originally due to 
Baldwin (1970, 1984). He used a standard Heckscher-Ohlin model to show that home-
biased government procurement is irrelevant for international specialisation. Miyagiwa 
(1991) has demonstrated that Baldwin’s “neutrality proposition” extends to a model of 
oligopoly with a homogeneous good but not with differentiated goods. We extend this 
research programme by examining the consequences of home-biased procurement on 
international specialisation in a monopolistic-competition model of trade and location. 
The analysis in this paper is of a positive nature. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that 
the issue of liberalisation of public procurement has important welfare implications. For 
that reason, it has been and continues to be on the policy agenda of European and other 
international organisations. Liberalisation of public procurement has been the object of a 
number of EEC Directives in the context of the implementation of the Single Market, as 
well as of the Government Procurement Agreement in the context of the WTO Uruguay 
Round. Negotiations on this issue are ongoing, both in the EU and at the WTO. Policy 
makers have long recognised that home-biased procurement may counter industrial 
relocation forces. In its official assessment of the effects of the Single Market programme, 
the European Commission has for instance acknowledged that the liberalisation of public 
procurement may lead to “the rationalisation of Community production on a smaller 
number of sites” (Emerson et al., 1988, p. 53). As more conventional forms of 
protectionism are being whittled away, biased procurement thus receives increasing 
attention in international policy fora.    
 
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we set out the theoretical model and derive 
two testable propositions. These propositions are tested empirically on input-output data for 
EU countries in Section 3. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Theory 
We explore the impact of home-biased public expenditure on international specialisation in 
two settings that have become benchmark models of the “new trade theory” and the “new 
economic geography”. Our analysis shows that, while Baldwin’s neutrality proposition 
holds for the perfectly competitive sectors, home-biased procurement does affect 
international specialisation when we allow for increasing returns and monopolistic 
competition. We first use the “new trade theory” setting to investigate whether home-biased 
public expenditure can attract industrial activity to the home country, and then we turn to a 
“new economic geography” model to explore the impact of home-biased procurement on 
agglomeration and dispersion forces. 
2.1. Public Expenditure in a Static Model of International Specialisation 
In this section we extend the model developed in Helpman and Krugman (1985, section 
10.4) by introducing government demand. This allows us to investigate the effects of home-
biased government procurement on international specialisation. 
The basic structure of the model is as follows. We assume two homogeneous factors of 
production, generically labelled l and k; two countries, indexed by i=1,2; and three sectors: 
X, Y, and Z. Two sectors are perfectly competitive (Y and Z) and one is monopolistically 
competitive (X).
1 Sector Z will serve as numéraire. Production technologies differ across 
sectors but are identical across countries. Sectors Y and Z are subject to a linearly 
homogeneous production function and operate under perfect competition. The average and 
marginal cost functions associated with these technologies are cY(w,r) and cZ(w,r), where 
the arguments are the remuneration to l and k. The X sector produces a differentiated 
commodity using a technology that requires a fixed cost f(w,r) and a constant marginal cost 
m(w,r). It is assumed that the functions m(w,r) and f(w,r) use factors in the same relative 
proportion. Thus, factor proportions in the X sector depend only on relative factor prices 
and not on the scale of firms. Since all X firms have identical costs, the optimal level of 
output is the same for all firms and is denoted by x. The average cost function of the X    
 
sector is cX(w,r) = m(w,r)+f(w,r)/x. Demand functions for factors obtain from the cost 
functions through Shephard’s lemma. We denote these demand functions as ls(w,r) and 
ks(w,r) with S = X,Y,Z. Further, we assume no factor intensity reversals. Finally, it is 
assumed that commodities Y and Z are traded internationally at zero costs while commodity 
X is traded internationally at a cost of the iceberg type. This means that for one unit of the X 
good shipped only a fraction  ] 1 , 0 ( ˛ t  arrives at its destination. The total number of X 
varieties produced in the world, denoted by N, is endogenously determined, and so is its 
distribution between countries. The number of X varieties produced in country i is ni and we 
have N ￿ n 1+n2. The world’s factor endowment is exogenous and denoted by L and K. 
Countries’ factors endowments are exogenous, and L1 ￿ L -L2 and K1 ￿ K -K2. The 
equilibrium equations are: 
( ) r w c p S S , = ,       S= Y, Z   (1) 
( ) r w m pX , ) / 1 1 ( = - s ,        (2) 
( ) x r w c p X X , , = ,         (3) 
( ) ( ) ( ) i i Z i X i Y L Z r w l xn r w l Y r w l = + + , , ,   i = 1,2    (4a) 
( ) ( ) ( ) i i Z i X i Y K Z r w k xn r w k Y r w k = + + , , ,   i = 1,2    (4b) 
Equations (1) and (2) express the usual condition that marginal revenue equal marginal cost 
in all sectors and countries. Equation (3) states the zero profit condition in sector X in all 
countries. Equations (4a) and (4b) state the market clearing conditions for factors in all 
countries. These eight equations describe the supply side of the model.  
To close the model, we need to describe the demand side in its two components, private and 
public. Households in both countries are assumed to have homothetic preferences.  
Specifically, we assume Dixit-Stiglitz preferences (i.e., a nested Cobb-Douglas-CES utility 
function) with Cobb-Douglas expenditure shares usi (S=X,Y,Z) and SSuSi=1, and with an 
elasticity of substitution of the CES sub-utility equal to the constant ( ) ¥ ˛ , 1 s . Households 
are taxed in a lump-sum fashion. Homothetic preferences assure that the distribution of 
taxation among households does not affect aggregate demand. Maximisation of utility 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
1 We have to assume that there is at least one more good than there are factors, in order to obtain a factor-
price equalisation set of full dimensionality. This is further explained below.    
 
subject to the budget constraint yields households’ demand functions. Aggregating across 
households gives demand functions for the differentiated good. Country i’s private demand 
for each variety produced in i is 
d
i Xi i X
d
i I P p x u
s s - - =
1  and for each variety produced in j is 
d
i Xi i X
d
i I P p x u t
s s s - - =
1 . The price index  ( )
( ) s s s s t
- - - - + =
1 / 1 1 1 1
X j X i i p n p n P  is the price index 
applicable to country i,  ( ) i i
d
i I I d - = 1  is households’ disposable income,  i d  is a taxation 
parameter, and Ii is the inner product between the vector of factor endowments and the 
vector of factor prices (households have claims on k). Since profits are zero, Ii is national 
income. For future reference, we define private expenditure on the X good in i as 
( ) i i Xi
P
Xi I E d u - ” 1 .  
Governments purchase goods that they use for their subsistence. The balanced budget 
requirement assures that expenditure equals tax collection. Tax revenue amounts to  i iI d  
and is allocated among goods according to the parameter  Si g  (S = X,Y,Z) with ￿ =
S Si 1 g . 
Government i’s expenditure on X goods is then  i i Xi
G
Xi I E d g ” .
2 
Following Baldwin (1970, 1984) and Miyagiwa (1991), we introduce an exogenously 
determined parameter that represents governments’ bias in favour of domestically produced 
goods:  ] 1 , 0 [ ˛ i f . Specifically, a proportion  i f  of government i’s purchases is reserved to 
domestic producers. The remainder of government expenditure is allocated efficiently 
among suppliers from both countries. A large  i f  therefore means a strong home bias. This 
simple assumption can represent two widely used discriminatory practices: (1) the outright 
exclusion of foreign bidders from domestic public tenders and (2) a domestic-content 
requirement imposed on foreign firms.
3 For clarity of exposition we shall say that 
government i’s procurement is “fully liberalised” if fi = 0, “home biased” if fi ˛( , ] 01 , 
and “wholly home biased” if fi = 1.
4 
                                                            
2 Governments’ expenditure shares can be formalised by assuming that governments produce a public good 
according to a Cobb-Douglas-CES production function with parameter shares gs, and with elasticity of 
substitution of the CES aggregate equal to the constant ( ) ¥ ˛ , 1 s . A constant per capita tax would instead 
result from Lindahl-type taxation if we assumed that the government produces a public good which enters the 
utility function in a separable way. 
3 On the practice of this discriminatory behaviour see Hoekman and Mavroidis (1997). 
4 Our assumption that home bias appears only in public expenditure and not in private expenditure is one of 
pure convenience. In fact, all our results would carry through if we allowed both sources of expenditure to 
exhibit home bias, as long as the home bias of public-sector purchasers exceeds that of private agents. The 
relevant analytical results are available from the authors.    
 
Equilibrium in the product market requires the following equations to hold: 
( )
G
Z
G
Z
P
Z
P
Z Z E E E E Z Z p 2 1 2 1 2 1 + + + = +       (5) 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( )   E n   +   E   E   P p   + E   E   P p x   p
G
X
G
X
P
X X
G
X
P
X X X 1 1 1 2 2 2
1
2
1
1 1 1
1
1
1 / 1 1 f f q f
s s s s - + - + =
- - - -  (6) 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( )   E n   +   E   E   P p   + E   E   P p x   p
G
X
G
X
P
X X
G
X
P
X X X 2 2 2 2 2 2
1
2
1
1 1 1
1
1
1 / 1 1 f f f q
s s s s - + - + =
- - - -  (7) 
where 
1 - ”
s t q . Equations (5)-(7) close the model. Equation (5) equates supply and 
demand for Z, where demand (r.h.s.) is represented in its four components: country 1’s 
private and public expenditure and country 2’s private and public expenditure. Equilibrium 
in the X sector requires two equations. Equation (6) and (7) represent the equality of 
demand and supply for any one variety produced in country 1 and 2 respectively. By 
Walras’ law the equilibrium condition for Y is redundant. The system (1)-(7) is composed 
of 11 independent equations and 12 unknowns (pX, pY, pZ, x, n1, n2, Y1, Y2, Z1, Z2, w, r). 
Taking pZ as the numéraire, the system is perfectly determined. 
While all endogenous variables are determined simultaneously, it is useful to inspect the 
subsystem (4)-(7) for an intuitive understanding of what shapes the pattern of international 
specialisation. Given prices and firm scale x, equations (6) and (7) determine n1 and n2 as 
functions of private and government expenditure. Then, given n1 and n2, the four equations 
(4a) and (4b) determine the four unknowns Y1, Y2, Z1, Z2 as functions of factor endowments. 
This means that, while private and government demand determine international 
specialisation in the monopolistically competitive sector, factor endowments determine 
international specialisation in the perfectly competitive sectors. Moreover, we can confirm 
Baldwin’s neutrality proposition by inspection of equation (5), which shows that world 
private plus government demand determine world output of Z (and Y) but not its 
international distribution. International specialisation in these sectors is fully determined by 
factor endowments via (4a) and (4b). Home bias in government procurement is therefore 
inconsequential for international specialisation in the perfectly competitive sectors. This 
result was derived by Baldwin (1970) in a partial-equilibrium small-country model, and we 
show that it extends to a two-country general-equilibrium setting. 
A final note on the dimensionality of the model is in order. Trade costs segment the market 
for the differentiated commodity and, therefore, require two equations for that market. A    
 
two-by-two model would then have too many equations for factor prices to equalise. In 
order to restore full dimensionality of the factor price equalisation set we need one more 
commodity or one less factor of production. While in textbook treatments a two-by-one 
model with labour as the only factor of production is usually preferred (e.g. Helpman and 
Krugman, 1985, section 10.4), we have opted for a three-by-two model in order to highlight 
the role of factor endowments in determining international specialisation in the perfectly 
competitive sectors.  
We now explore the effect of private and government demand on international 
specialisation. By inspection of the system (1)-(7) it is immediate that  2 1 n n =  is an 
equilibrium when countries are identical, i.e., when 
P
X
P
X E E 2 1 = , 
G
X
G
X E E 2 1 = , and  2 1 f f = . 
The nonlinearity of the model prevents us from deriving a simple reduced form. However, 
we can find the relationship we are interested in by differentiating the system (1)-(7) with 
respect to changes in private and public expenditure at the equilibrium point n1 = n2. It will 
be convenient to use the following definitions: 
N n / 1 ” h ,    
G
X
G
X
P
X
P
X XW E E E E E 2 1 2 1 + + + ” , 
XW
P
X
P
X P
E
E E 2 1 +
” e ,   
XW
G
X
G
X G
E
E E 2 1 +
” e , 
P
X
P
X
P
Xi P
i E E
E
2 1 +
” e ,     G
X
G
X
G
Xi G
i E E
E
2 1 +
” e . 
We shock expenditure in such a way that world private and world public expenditure on 
each commodity remain unchanged, i.e.  SW E  (S = X,Y,Z), 
G e , and 
P e  are held constant. 
This implies that relative prices of commodities will remain unchanged, and the effect on 
specialisation, if any, is therefore due to changes in a country’s share of world public and 
private expenditure 
G
i e  and 
P
i e . Technically, this is achieved when we disturb the 
equilibrium by  2 1 X X d d g g - = , and by  2 1 X X d d u u - = . Differentiation around the 
equilibrium point, where n1= n2, yields the following expression: 
( )
( )
( )( )
( )
G
G
G
P
G
P
d d d 1
2
2 1
1
2
2
4 1
2 1 1
4 1
1
e
b
qfe q
e qf q q
e
b
qfe q
e q
h
4 4 4 3 4 4 4 2 1 4 4 3 4 4 2 1 + -
+ - +
+
+ -
-
= .    (8)    
 
The first term on the r.h.s. is the effect of private expenditure. For convenience we denote 
the coefficient of 
P d 1 e  by 1 b . This term shows that, ceteris paribus, large private 
expenditure on X results in large domestic output of X (remember that 0 < è < 1). The 
second term is the effect of government expenditure. For convenience we denote the 
coefficient of 
G d 1 e  by  2 b . This term shows that, ceteris paribus, large and home-biased 
government expenditure on X results in large domestic output of X. The sum  2 1 b b +  is a 
version of the “market size” effect (Helpman and Krugman, 1985, section 10.4). 
Effectively, we have decomposed the market size effect into a private and a public 
component. If government procurement is zero ( 0 =
G e ) or fully liberalised ( 0 = f ), then 
1
1
1
2 1 >
-
+
= +
q
q
b b , which is the same as in the Helpman-Krugman model.
 5 
It is interesting to inspect the relative size of  1 b  and  2 b , because this gives us the relative 
size of the impact of private and government demand on international specialisation. The 
relative size of  1 b  and  2 b  depends on the relative size of 
G e  and 
P e . However, if we 
define 
P b e b / 1 1 ”  and 
G b e b / 2 2 ” , inspection of equation (8) shows that  2 1 b b <  
unambiguously. Hence, the impact of home-biased public procurement is larger than the 
impact of private demand when both are appropriately weighted by their size. This result 
may be expressed in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. The country with relatively large home-biased public expenditure on the 
differentiated good X will, ceteris paribus, be relatively specialised in the production of X.  
The size-weighted impact of home-biased public procurement is larger than the size-
weighted impact of private expenditure. We refer to this as the “pull” effect.  
In conclusion, we have found that home-biased procurement influences international 
specialisation in some sectors but not in others, and that its size-weighted impact is larger 
than the impact of private expenditure. In the empirical section we estimate equation (8) 
and find that for the sectors where home-biased procurement influences international 
specialisation the estimated parameters satisfy the inequality  2 1 b b < .  
 
                                                            
5 In the literature, the market size effect usually results from an expenditure shock that is generated by a 
change in country size, whereas here it results from a shock to the Cobb-Douglas expenditure share. In the 
context of this paper the two types of shocks have identical consequences.     
 
2.2. Public Expenditure in a Dynamic Model of International Specialisation 
In “new economic geography” models, international specialisation is shaped by dynamic 
processes which result from the tension between agglomeration and dispersion forces. At 
high trade costs dispersion forces prevail and the industrial activity is evenly distributed 
across countries (weak international specialisation). At low trade costs agglomeration 
forces take over, and increasing-returns activity concentrates in a subset of countries (strong 
international specialisation). In this section we use such a model to study the effect of 
home-biased government procurement on the likelihood and intensity of industrial 
agglomeration.  
We use a variant of the model in Krugman and Venables (1995). The demand side of the 
model is the same as in section 2.1 of this paper. The supply side needs some modification. 
We abstract from factor endowments and assume a single factor of production, labour, and 
we can thus also restrict the analysis to two sectors. Employment in each sector and country 
is denoted by LSi, where S = X,Y; and i = 1,2. Analogously, wages in each sector and 
country are denoted by wSi. By choice of units we set wZi = 1. As in the previous section, 
each variety of the differentiated good produced by the X sector is subject to economies of 
scale represented by a fixed cost and constant marginal costs. The difference is that the 
fixed and marginal costs are both in terms of a composite input V, which in turn is produced 
with labour and X itself. The input requirement per x units of output is given by 
x + V b a = . Each firm produces V according to  ( ) [ ] ( )
m m m m / 1 /
1 X l V
- - = , where  ( ) 1 , 0 ˛ m  
represents the importance of the industry’s output as its own intermediate input. Given this 
technology, the expression for total costs is  ( ) x + P w TC i Mi i b a
m m - =
1 . Finally, we should note 
that, unlike in the previous section,  private expenditure on X now includes firms’ demand 
for intermediate inputs.
6 The expression for private expenditure then becomes 
( ) x   p   n     +   I   E Xi i i i Xi
P
Xi m d u - = 1 . The market-clearing equations are the same as in the static 
model (equations (5)-(7)), provided that we apply the appropriate expressions for 
P
Xi E . 
Concerning the dynamics of the model, it is assumed that labour is perfectly mobile 
between the Y and Z sectors, so that we have wYi = wZi = 1 (i = 1,2) at any time. Labour is 
only imperfectly mobile between the X sector and the other two sectors and moves slowly 
into (out of) the X sector as the X wage exceeds (is smaller than) the wage in the Y and Z 
                                                            
6 Since profits are zero, firms’ aggregate expenditure on X is m times firms’ aggregate revenue.    
 
sectors.
7 This assumption can be formalised with the two differential equations 
( ) 1 1 1 Z X X w w L - =
•
x  and  ( ) 2 2 2 Z X X w w   L - =
•
x , where x is an arbitrary constant.
8 The total 
number of varieties and world employment in X will remain constant, because world 
expenditure on manufactures is assumed constant over time. Individual countries’ 
employment in X can, however, change over time. Note that, since world employment is 
held constant, the two differential equations can be nicely compacted into one. Defining 
2 1 X X w w - ” w , and using the fact that labour market clearing implies that  n1/(n1+n2) = 
LX1/(LX1+LX2), we can rewrite the differential equations as: 
( ) 2 1 2 1 , , , , ; d d f f t h w h =
•
.        (9) 
Equation (9) highlights the fact that w depends on the state variable h, on trade costs and on 
the public procurement parameters. The system is at rest when it reaches an internal 
solution (incomplete specialisation) or when the X sector is completely agglomerated in one 
country (complete specialisation). Internal solutions are are characterised by wage 
equalisation across sectors, i.e., wZi=wYi=wXi=1 (i=1,2). Complete agglomeration of X 
activity in one country is associated with wage inequality, i.e. wX1>1 if h=1, or wX2>1 if 
h=0. Whether dispersion forces or agglomeration forces prevail depends on trade costs and 
on the parameters of government procurement. It is to this analysis that we turn now. 
The economic mechanisms at work can be described in an intuitive way. For the sake of 
simplicity suppose that, starting from equilibrium, the system is perturbed by a random 
shock that increases the number of firms in 1 and decreases it in 2. This initial perturbation 
sets in motion four dynamic forces. Two of these forces reinforce the initial shock, and are 
therefore called “agglomeration forces”. The other two counteract the initial shock and are 
therefore referred to as “dispersion forces”. 
1. The expression for total costs reveals that the reduction of P1 (and the increase of P2) 
caused by the initial increase in n1 and decrease in n2 reduces total costs, thereby 
raising firms’ potential profitability in 1 (and reducing it in 2), and thus favouring 
                                                            
7 Alternatively, it could be assumed that labour is perfectly mobile across all sectors and that firms move to 
the country that yields highest profits. The dynamics resulting from this alternative assumption would be 
identical to those we work with.  
8 This simplifying practice, which neglects expectations, is widely adopted in the literature and can be 
corroborated through examination of richer dynamic structures (see, e.g., Ottaviano, 1999).    
 
further entry of firms in 1 (and pushing firms out of the market in 2). This mechanism, 
which is known as the forward linkage, tends to reinforce the initial disturbance and is, 
therefore, an agglomeration force. 
2. The expression for private expenditure shows that increase in n1 (a decrease in n2) 
increases the expenditure on manufactures produced in 1 via an increase in the demand 
for intermediate inputs. This raises potential profitability in 1 (and reduces it in 2), 
thereby encouraging new entry if firms in 1 (and exit in 2). This mechanism, known as 
backward linkage, tends to reinforce the initial disturbance and is therefore an 
agglomeration force.  
3. An increase in n1 shifts the demand faced by each firms from country 1 to the left, and 
vice-versa in 2. This reduces the potential profitability in 1 and increases it in 2 thus 
discouraging further entry of firms in 1. This mechanism, known as the competition 
effect, counteracts the initial disturbance and is therefore a dispersion force.  
4. Inspection of the r.h.s. of (6) and (7) shows that an increase in n1 (decrease in n2) 
reduces government expenditure on each variety produced in 1 and increases 
expenditure on each variety produced in 2, thus reducing potential profitability in 1 and 
increasing it in 2. This, in turn, discourages further entry of firms in 1 (while it 
encourages entry in 2), and therefore acts as a dispersion force. We refer to this force 
as the “spread” effect of home-biased public expenditure. The impact of this force is 
weakened as public procurement becomes more liberalised, and it disappears if 
procurement is fully liberalised. 
The relative strength of agglomeration and dispersion forces determines the stability of the 
initial equilibrium. When trade costs are high enough dispersion forces always prevail, 
while agglomeration forces may dominate at low trade costs. We can illustrate the effect of 
home-biased procurement on the stability of the equilibria by use of a phase diagram 
(Figure 1). This considers only the case where trade costs are sufficiently low, i.e. such that, 
if procurement were fully liberalised, agglomeration would occur.
9 
 
                                                            
9 The results illustrated in Figure 1, including the threshold values that define “high” and “low” trade costs, 
are derived analytically in Trionfetti (2000b).     
 
FIGURE 1: Public expenditure and specialisation in an economic geography model 
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There are at most three equilibria in the set (0,1). Let us call the closest one to 0 the 
“western” equilibrium, the middle one “central” equilibrium, and the one furthest away 
from 0 the “eastern” equilibrium. These three equilibria are represented in Figure 1 by  W h , 
C h ,  E h . For simplicity, we assume countries to be identical in every respect, so that 
2 / 1 = C h . In the previous section we were interested in the response of the equilibrium to 
asymmetric government demand shocks. Here we are concerned with the number and 
stability of the equilibria. 
Three possibilities emerge. 
1. If public procurement is fully liberalised, the central equilibrium is unstable, and the X 
sector completely agglomerates in country 1 or 2. This case is depicted by the solid line.  
2. If public procurement is home biased but 
G
Xi iE f  is small in both countries, the central 
equilibrium is unstable but there are two other equilibria with incomplete agglomeration 
( W h  and  E h ), which are stable. Therefore, some but not all of the X sector eventually 
agglomerates in country 1 or 2. This case is depicted by the dashed line. Furthermore, 
the distance between  W h  and  E h  decreases as 
G
Xi iE f  increases in both countries. 
3. If public procurement is home biased and 
G
Xi iE f  is large in both countries, then the 
central equilibrium is stable. Therefore, no agglomeration will take place regardless of 
trade costs. This case is depicted by the dotted line.    
 
The message emerging from these three cases is that home-biased procurement reduces the 
likelihood and intensity of industrial agglomeration. It does so in two ways. First, it may 
stabilise the central equilibrium, as is clear from a comparison of case 3 with case 1. 
Second, even if the central equilibrium becomes unstable, the intensity of agglomeration 
will relate negatively to the importance of home-biased procurement. This is shown in case 
2.  
Proposition 2. Large and home-biased public expenditure in one or both countries reduces 
the likelihood and intensity of industrial agglomeration. We refer to this proposition as the 
“spread” effect. 
This is the second result that we can subject to empirical investigation, to which we turn 
next. 
3.  Empirical Evidence 
Our theoretical model focuses on the distinction between final expenditure of private agents 
and final expenditure of the government, assuming that the latter is more home biased than 
the former. Input-output tables provide the best statistical information for a sector-level 
empirical quantification of these two expenditure types. Our study is based on a cross-
country set of comparable input-output tables which has been compiled by Eurostat and 
covers up to 11 EU member countries for the period 1970-1985 in five-yearly intervals.
10 
These input-output tables distinguish 18 industrial sectors. 
Before we analyse the relationship between countries’ sectoral specialisation and their 
relative public and private expenditures, some discussion of the relative home biases in 
public and private spending is warranted. Our key assumption is that public-sector 
purchasers are more home biased than private agents. We do not seek to verify this 
hypothesis here, since  evidence in its support has been produced elsewhere. Mastanduno 
(1991) and Hoekman and Mavroidis (1997) have provided compelling case studies. 
Trionfetti (2000a) has compared import shares between public and private purchasers in the 
Eurostat input-output dataset that we use here (confined to 1985), and he found that import 
propensities were lower for public than for private purchasers in 77 percent of all 
observations. Similarly, the European Commission (1997) reported that, in 1987, less than 
                                                            
10 Eurostat’s input-output tables for more recent years use a less disaggregated sectoral classification for 
manufacturing industries and are therefore not considered in this paper. A detailed description of the data set 
is given in the Data Appendix.    
 
two percent of public purchasing of EU countries was awarded to non-national suppliers, 
compared to shares ranging between 25 and 45 percent for private-sector purchases, and it 
identified public procurement as one of the principal remaining obstacles to a fully-fledged 
Single Market. A fortiori, discriminatory public procurement must have been a pervasive 
phenomenon in EU countries during the 1970-85 period, which we cover in our empirical 
study. 
3.1 The Pull Effect of Public Expenditure 
The first proposition derived from our model stipulates that, other things equal, relatively 
large discriminatory government expenditure on the product of an increasing-returns 
industry will result in relatively large domestic output of that product. 
We define industrial specialisation through the following measure (year subscripts 
implied): 
) ( ) (
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￿
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OUT
OUT
OUT
OUTdev ,  where  ) 1 , 1 (- ˛ OUTdev ,  (10) 
and where OUT stands for output, s again represents industries and i stands for countries. In 
order to test the sensitivity of our results to the underlying definition of production, we 
compute the measure VAdev, which is based on value added data and constructed in 
identical fashion to OUTdev. The first summand in equation (9) is the exact empirical 
representation of h in our theoretical model, i.e. a country’s share in world output of a 
certain industry. For the empirics we subtract from this the country’s share in total world 
output as a scaling factor, so as to avoid spurious regression results linking expenditure and 
production shares solely through differences in country sizes. OUTdev and VAdev are 
centred symmetrically around zero, which represents the point where a country’s share in 
the world production of an industry corresponds exactly to that country’s share in the 
world’s total manufacturing production. Appendix Table 1 reports the sectors of strongest 
and weakest specialisation according to VAdev for each country. 
Analogously, we construct a measure of idiosyncratic government demand (year subscripts 
implied):    
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DGOV stands for government expenditure, which we define as the sum of three expenditure 
headings in the input-output tables: “general public services” (NACE I810), “non-market 
services of education and research” (NACE I850), and “non-market services of health” 
(NACE I890). In addition, we compute a measure of idiosyncratic private demand 
DPRIVdev by applying the same formula to the expenditure category “final consumption of 
households on the economic territory” (NACE F01); and a measure of total idiosyncratic 
final demand Ddev, which is the sum of public and private final demand. The first 
summand in the expression for DGOVdev (DPRIVdev) is the exact representation of 
G
i e  
(
P
i e ) in our theoretical model, while the second term provides the scaling factor needed to 
eliminate the possibility of contaminating regression estimates with pure country-size 
effects. 
3.1.1. Regressing Specialisation on Idiosyncratic Demand 
We can now relate our measure of international specialisation to idiosyncratic government 
demand. According to our first proposition, a pull effect would manifest itself through a 
positive relation between these two variables. As a first exercise we have produced 
bivariate plots for our four sample years, based on specialisation in output (Figure 2) and in 
value added (Figure 3). A positive relationship between the two variables is apparent, but 
the correlations look rather weak.
11 
Our second step was to regress specialisation on idiosyncratic demand. These results are 
reported in Table 1. Due to the scaling of our variables we could force the constant term to 
zero in all specifications – estimations with an intercept never produced a significant 
coefficient on the constant. Although our dependent variable is bounded, we proceeded 
with a linear specification, since we do not want to make out-of-sample predictions and 
since estimations based on limited dependent variable models produced substantially 
equivalent results for the relevant data ranges. In Model I of Table 1, we have simply 
regressed specialisation on Ddev in the pooled data. The significant positive coefficients 
                                                            
11 We find a correlation coefficient of 0.20 between DGOVdev and both OUTdev and VAdev, pooled across 
sample years (see Appendix Table 2). These correlations are statistically significantly different from zero at 
the 99.99 percent confidence level.    
 
confirm the finding of Davis and Weinstein (1998) that home markets matter for industrial 
location. Our result is particularly strong since we considered only demand for final 
products in our definition of “home markets” and could therefore eliminate the possibility 
of upward bias due to simultaneity between output and demand in the case where demand 
includes expenditure on intermediate products as well as on final goods. 
In Model II of Table 1 we have estimated equation (8) in the pooled dataset by taking 
account separately of the private and public components of idiosyncratic expenditure. Both 
coefficients are positive and precisely estimated, but the coefficient on private demand 
deviations (0.55 for output, 0.39 for value added) is substantially larger than that on public 
demand deviations (0.08 and 0.09 respectively). These coefficients correspond to b1 and b2 
of equation (8). Recall from Section 2.1 that in interpreting these coefficients one ought to 
keep in mind the different sizes of private and public demand of final manufactures. It is 
through 
P b e b / 1 1 =  and 
G b e b / 2 2 =  that the pull effect of a marginal dollar spent by public 
and private agents can be estimated. Appendix Table 1 shows that on average private 
demand was roughly ten times the size of government demand. Precisely, the average share 
of public expenditure in total final expenditure, e
G, pooled across years in our dataset is 
0.106. Our estimated b1 is therefore equal to 0.61 in the output specification and to 0.44 in 
the value added specification, while our estimate of b2 is 0.73 and 0.87 respectively. These 
results suggest the presence of a pull effect of public expenditure: an extra dollar spent by 
government has a stronger effect on attracting production in the relevant sector than an 
extra dollar spent by private agents. This effect is not statistically significant in the output 
specifications, but in the value added specifications the 95% confidence intervals of the 
estimated bs do not overlap. 
In a third step, we have estimated the empirical version of equation (8) separately for each 
sample year (Models III to VI in Table 1). We find evidence of an increasing tendency in 
the pull effect of government purchases. Over the period of our sample, therefore, the 
impact of (discriminatory) public expenditure on the location of manufacturing activities 
seems to have grown. 
Finally, we augmented the basic specification with the variable GOVBIAS, which is a proxy 
for the degree of bias in public procurement by industry and country. This variable is taken 
from Nerb (1987), who, based on a survey of 11,000 European firms in the mid-1980s,    
 
reported the percentage of firms who considered the opening of public procurement 
markets to be “very important”. This variable might be affected not only by the degree of 
bias of public purchasers in different industries and countries but also by the size of public 
procurement. However, the correlation between the two variables turns out to be very small 
and statistically insignificant in our dataset (see Appendix Table 2). We therefore added 
that variable, as well as an interaction term with DGOVdev, to the baseline specification. 
The expected positive coefficients are found on our bias variables, and the estimated 
coefficients on idiosyncratic public and private expenditure are barely affected. This result 
suggests that the more biased public authorities are in their purchasing activities, the 
stronger is the pull effect of their expenditure. The data thus appear to support the intuitive 
prediction of our theoretical model. 
3.1.2. Adding Endowments and Input-Output Linkages 
Our theoretical setup in Section 2 is richer than the empirical specification that we have 
estimated so far. Specifically, the models incorporate two additional determinants of 
international specialisation: factor-endowment differences across countries combined with 
different factor requirements of sectors, and agglomeration forces based on input-output 
linkages among firms. We therefore extend the original empirical specification that was 
based on equation (8) by adding various combinations of the following regressors (year 
subscripts implied): 
1. PRIMARYintersi = (Primary inputs used / Output)s * 
(Primary inputs produced / Manufacturing output)i 
2. AGRIintersi = (Agricultural inputs used / Output)s * 
(Agricultural inputs produced /  Manufacturing output)i 
3. ENERGYintersi = (Energy inputs used / Output)s * 
(Energy inputs produced / Manufacturing output)i 
4. CAPITALintersi = (Fixed capital consumption / Output)s * (Capital stock per 
worker)i 
5. WAGESHAREintersi = (Wages / Output)s * (Wages / GDP)i 
6. MANINPintersi = (Manufactured inputs used / Output)s * 
 (Manufactured inputs produced / Manufacturing output)i 
The first five regressors are interaction variables capturing the factor abundance of 
countries and the factor intensities of industries, in the spirit of Heckscher-Ohlin theory. 
The sixth regressor is constructed in order to control for input-output linkages among    
 
manufacturing industries, which can give rise to endogenous geographical concentrations 
(an “industrial base”) as described in Section 2.2. Details on the construction of these 
variables are given in the Data Appendix. 
If factor endowments and input-output linkages are important determinants of industrial 
specialisation among EU countries, then we would expect to find positive and significant 
coefficients on all of the regressors. Our results for the entire dataset, a representative 
selection of which we report in Table 2, are largely consistent with those theoretical priors. 
We have experimented with varying specifications of the estimating equation as well as 
with estimation techniques that take account of potential year-specific heteroskedasticity.
12 
Almost all of the estimated coefficients are positive, and many are statistically significant. 
The exception is the variable capturing input-output linkages, which seems very sensitive to 
the chosen specification and gives rise to significant positive as well as negative 
coefficients. A comparison of the results in Table 2 with those of Table 1 shows that 
inclusion of the additional regressors adds very little to the explanatory power of the model; 
R-squares are raised only slightly, and the estimated coefficients on DGOVdev and 
DPRIVdev are very stable. It is of course not unexpected that endowment differences 
explain a small share of observed specialisation differences across the relatively 
homogeneous countries of Western Europe; nor would it appear surprising that we struggle 
to pick up robust evidence of geographical industry clusters based on input linkages, given 
that such concentrations of manufacturing activity would more likely appear in region-level 
data than in a country-level dataset. 
The main aim of this exercise, however, is not to assess the relative explanatory power of 
alternative determinants of international specialisation, but to test the robustness of the 
estimated coefficients on the variables that represent idiosyncrasies in public and private 
final expenditure. Our estimated relationships turn out to be remarkably unaffected by the 
inclusion of any combination of additional control variables. The coefficients on DGOVdev 
and on DPRIVdev are always statistically significant, and their relative size is never 
significantly affected. We therefore conclude that demand idiosyncrasies are an important 
factor shaping the patterns of industrial specialisation among EU countries, and in 
particular that there is robust evidence of a pull effect from public expenditure. 
                                                            
12 The estimation might be more efficient if one could account for potential correlation of disturbances across 
years. This cannot be done for the entire dataset, due to the unbalanced nature of the panel, but estimation on    
 
As a complement to the pooled runs, we have also estimated our model of specialisation 
separately for each of the 18 industries in our sample. Table 3 reports these results. All 
variables with names ending on “abund” correspond to the country-level endowment 
abundance terms, i.e. the second multiplicand in each expression that defines the interaction 
terms given above. We find largely plausible coefficients on our control variables (food 
sectors are bigger in countries with abundant agricultural inputs, textiles and leather 
industries are smaller in countries with a large industrial base, etc.). There are a number of 
industries with statistically significant positive specialisation effects of public expenditure 
(metal goods, motor vehicles, other transport equipment, rubber and plastic, instrument 
engineering). On the other hand, there are industries where endowments have significant 
explanatory powers and expenditure shares do not (chemicals, meat products, timber and 
furniture, paper and printing). If we took our static model literally, we would attribute the 
former set of industries to the monopolistically competitive category, whilst the latter 
industries would be of the perfectly competitive type. However, some caution is warranted 
in the interpretation of these results. Most strikingly, we find implausibly negative and 
significant coefficients on the public expenditure variable for two industries, electrical 
goods and beverages. These counterintuitive results serve as a reminder of the large range 
of unexplained variation in our specialisation measures, and they are possibly due to 
correlation of idiosyncrasies in public expenditure with some other unobserved variable 
that determines specialisation. This caveat notwithstanding, the industry-by-industry 
regressions broadly support the earlier finding that demand deviations have significant pull 
effects on sectoral specialisation among EU countries. 
3.2. The Spread Effect of Public Expenditure 
According to our second theoretical proposition, the share of (discriminatory) public 
expenditure in an increasing-returns sector will relate negatively to the degree of 
specialisation of that sector across countries. This spread effect of government demand is 
not immediately evident in our dataset. Figure 4 plots industry averages of absolute 
specialisation measures (|OUTdev|) on the industry share of public expenditure scaled to 
domestic absorption. For each of the four sample years, we find a tight cluster of 
observations near the origin and a single outlier far to the northeast. Fitting a linear 
regression line to these data yields a statistically significant positive slope coefficient 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
the subsample of countries for which we have observations for all four sample years produced substantially 
equivalent results.    
 
(Table 4, Model I). As such, the result is diametrically opposed to our theoretical 
proposition that government expenditure attenuates specialisation pressures. 
It is worth taking a closer look at the data. Figure 4 shows that the single outlier  in all years 
relates to the “other transport equipment” sector (NACE 290). If we drop this observation 
from the dataset, we find the expected negative impact of public expenditure on 
specialisation in output terms (Figure 5) and in value added terms (Figure 6). These 
negative relationships are confirmed by fitting a linear model to the censored dataset (Table 
4, Model II). Hence, our data set as a whole appears to reject the spread effect, yet the 
elimination of a single industry overturns this result in favour of our proposition. 
Is it justifiable to drop NACE 290 from the dataset for the purpose of this exercise? In 
principle, since it is the sector that exhibits by far the largest share of public-sector demand 
(see Figure 4), NACE 290 might provide our most reliable observation. On the other hand, 
there are good reasons to believe that the allocation of production in many subsectors of 
this industry are not primarily driven by market forces. Around two thirds of output values 
in NACE 290 are accounted for by aircraft production. Inspection of the raw data reveals 
that in all sample years the most specialised countries (in terms of both OUTdev and 
VAdev) were the UK and France, while Italy and Germany are consistently situated at the 
bottom of the specialisation scale. This pattern bears a remarkable resemblance with the 
distribution of defence production across EU countries, which is largely shaped by the 
constraints imposed on Germany and Italy after the second world war rather than by market 
forces. A case can thus be made for considering the high absolute specialisation index for 
NACE 290 as the outcome of determinants that are outside our modelling framework. 
Based on this argument, we proceeded to work with a censored dataset, excluding NACE 
290.
13  
We estimated a linear relationship between the share of government expenditure in 
domestic absorption on the intensity of specialisation, allowing for year-specific fixed 
effects (Table 4, Model II). The negative and significant coefficient estimates provide 
support for the spread effect. To test the sensitivity of the result to the scaling of the 
                                                            
13 Four-digit data, taken from the OECD’s Comtap database, show that in 1985 production of aircraft 
accounted for 67 (66) percent of output in the “other transport equipment” industry in the UK (France), while 
the corresponding shares for Germany and Italy were considerably lower at 44 and 25 percent respectively. 
This suggests that specialisation patterns in NACE 290 are shaped by the location of aircraft production, 
which is highly politicised at the supra-national level.    
 
regressors, we estimated the model on the share of public expenditure in total final 
expenditure (instead of absorption), and found the result substantially unchanged (Table 4, 
Model III). Finally, we ran the regression separately for each sample year and obtained 
consistently negative parameter estimates (Table 4, Models IV-VII). The year-by-year 
coefficients are statistically significant only in one of eight cases, but, given the small 
sample size at the year level and the stability of the estimated coefficients, our finding 
seems quite robust. 
It may be argued that our test of the spread effect could be biased due to unobserved 
determinants of the intensity of industrial specialisation that are statistically correlated with 
public expenditure shares. This is a valid concern, but we face two problems in trying to 
address it. First, theory does not serve as a useful guide to the specification of control 
variables in such an exercise. While trade and geography models are useful in predicting 
where certain types of industries will concentrate, they do not provide us with priors on 
what features make certain industries more or less concentrated across countries. Second, 
the conventional empirical method to address such uncertainty in a context like ours is to 
introduce dummy variables for unknown panel-specific effects; but we are seriously 
constrained in such an exercise by a lack of degrees of freedom.
14 Our empirical verdict in 
favour of the spread effect must therefore remain a qualified one until such a time when we 
can draw on some formal priors about what other factors may influence the overall degree 
to which different industries are spread or concentrated across countries. 
4. Conclusions 
We have investigated the consequences of discriminatory public expenditure on the pattern 
of international specialisation. First, we studied this issue theoretically in models with both 
perfectly competitive and monopolistically competitive sectors. While our analysis 
confirms that the impact of home-biased procurement is neutral with respect to 
international specialisation in perfectly competitive sectors, we have identified two effects 
of home-biased public expenditure that appear in monopolistically competitive sectors. 
First, we demonstrated the possibility of a “pull” effect of discriminatory public 
expenditure: home-biased government expenditure on a certain good will tend to attract 
production of that good to the country. Second, we identified a “spread” effect: home-
                                                            
14 Estimation of the model with industry as well as year fixed effects in the censored dataset produced 
consistently negative coefficients on public expenditure shares, but statistical significance was never found. 
These results are available from the authors on request.    
 
biased public expenditure by all countries reduces the likelihood and intensity of 
agglomeration of increasing-returns industries in a subset of countries. 
The existence of pull and spread effects was then explored empirically in an input-output 
dataset for the EU, covering the period 1970-85. We found evidence in support of both 
effects. On average, a country with large government procurement on a good will tend to 
specialise in the production of that good. We also found evidence that the effect of 
government demand on international specialisation is stronger than the effect of private 
demand. Further, we have found some evidence of the spread effect. Industries that are 
subject to a relatively large share of public expenditure tend to be less concentrated across 
EU countries. 
Our study is purely positive in nature. We find that public expenditure matters for 
international specialisation and can counteract agglomeration. This raises the important 
question of the associated welfare effects, which we leave for future research.    
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DATA APPENDIX 
 
 
Our input-output data are taken from the Eurostat “National Accounts ESA” series. We 
have data for 18 NACE two-digit manufacturing sectors, up to 11 EU countries and four 
sample years (1970, 1975, 1980 and 1985). The country coverage in each sample year can 
be gleaned from Appendix Table 1. We did not use more recent data, since the available 
level of sectoral disaggregation in data after 1985 is significantly lower. The data for 1970 
and 1975 were converted into deutschmarks at current exchange rates, and those for 1980 
and 1985 were converted into current ECUs. The sample contains up to 630 country-
industry-year observations. 
 
Most of the interaction terms used in the model underlying Tables 2 and 3 are based on 
variables taken from the input-output database: 
• PRIMARYinter: “Primary inputs used” is defined as the value of goods from NACE 
industries I010-I150 (agricultural and mineral products, power) that are used as 
intermediate inputs in the 18 manufacturing sectors in the home country. “Primary 
inputs produced” is the total value of output of NACE industries I010-I150 that is 
produced in the home country and used as an input in one of the manufacturing 
industries. 
• AGRIinter: “Agricultural inputs used” and “produced” are defined equivalently, but 
restricted to NACE industry I010 (agriculture, forestry and fishing). 
• ENERGYinter: “Energy inputs used” and “produced” are defined equivalently, but 
restricted to NACE industries I020-I150 (power and mineral products). 
• WAGESHAREinter: This is based on the heading “gross wages and salaries” in the 
input-output tables (NACE F010). Coverage of this variable over countries and 
years is incomplete. 
• MANINPinter: “Manufactured inputs used” is defined as the value of goods from 
the 18 NACE industries I270-I510 (manufacturing) that are used as inputs for 
production in those sectors in the home country. “Manufacturing inputs produced” 
is the total output of NACE industries I270-I510 that is produced in the home 
country and used as an input in one of those industries. 
 
For the construction of CAPITALinter we used data on “fixed capital consumption” in the 
input-output table (NACE F080), and values for “capital stock per worker” are taken from 
the Penn World Tables. Coverage of this variable over countries and years is incomplete.    
 
TABLE 1: Demand Deviations and Specialisation in Production: Pooled Runs 
 
OUTdev  VAdev   
Model 
Regressand: 
Regressors:  OLS/beta coeff. 
(t stat) 
R
2 
No.obs 
OLS/beta coeff. 
(t stat) 
R
2 
No.obs 
I  Ddev 
 
0.60 / 0.61 
(10.41)
*** 
0.37 
627 
0.47 / 0.42 
(7.13)
 *** 
0.18 
627 
 
II 
DPRIVdev 
 
DGOVdev 
0.55 / 0.53 
(11.22)
 *** 
0.08 / 0.16 
(2.94)
 *** 
 
 
0.32 
627 
0.39 / 0.33 
(6.59)
 *** 
0.09 / 0.17 
(2.75)
 *** 
 
 
0.15 
627 
 
III 
1970: 
     DPRIVdev 
 
     DGOVdev 
 
0.59 / 0.63 
(7.03)
 *** 
0.05 / 0.12 
(1.13) 
 
 
 
 
0.40 
162 
 
0.33 / 0.33 
(2.69)
 *** 
0.06 / 0.14 
(1.01) 
 
 
 
 
0.12 
162 
 
IV 
1975: 
     DPRIVdev 
 
     DGOVdev 
 
0.51 / 0.52 
(5.77)
 *** 
0.05 / 0.11 
(0.83) 
 
 
 
 
0.30 
162 
 
0.34 / 0.32 
(3.27)
 *** 
0.01 / 0.01 
(0.07) 
 
 
 
 
0.10 
162 
 
V 
1980: 
     DPRIVdev 
 
     DGOVdev 
 
0.46 / 0.45 
(4.96)
 *** 
0.08 / 0.14 
(1.45) 
 
 
 
 
0.25 
159 
 
0.37 / 0.33 
(3.55)
 *** 
0.09 / 0.14 
(1.08) 
 
 
 
 
0.15 
159 
 
VI 
1985: 
     DPRIVdev 
 
     DGOVdev 
 
0.64 / 0.50 
(5.04)
 *** 
0.13 / 0.26 
(2.77)
 *** 
 
 
 
 
0.35 
144 
 
0.54 / 0.36 
(3.47)
 *** 
0.19 / 0.31 
(3.55)
 *** 
 
 
 
 
0.26 
144 
VII  DPRIVdev 
 
DGOVdev 
 
GOVBIAS 
 
DGOVdev*GOVBIAS 
 
0.51 / 0.48 
(10.14)
 *** 
0.09 / 0.18 
(3.28)
 *** 
0.38 / 0.02 
(0.63) 
3.59 / 0.17 
(3.86)
 *** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.32 
560 
0.40 / 0.35 
(6.88)
 *** 
0.10 / 0.19 
(2.84)
 *** 
0.22 / 0.09 
(2.35)
 ** 
1.83 / 0.08 
(1.17) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.18 
560 
 
Notes: See text for definition of variables and data. t statistics are White-adjusted.  
***/
**/
*: statistically significant at 
1/5/10% level. 
    
 
TABLE 2: Demand Deviations, Supply-Side Locational Determinants and Specialisation in Production: Pooled Runs 
 
Model:  I  II  III  IV  V 
Estimation method:  OLS 
1  OLS 
1  OLS 
1  OLS with panel-corrected 
standard errors 
2 
Feasible GLS (panel 
heteroskedasticity)
 3 
Regressand:  OUTdev  VAdev  OUTdev  VAdev  OUTdev  VAdev  OUTdev  VAdev  OUTdev  VAdev 
Regressors:                     
DGOVdev  0.08 
(2.86)
 *** 
0.09 
(2.72)
 *** 
0.08 
(2.86)
 *** 
0.09 
(2.72)
 *** 
0.08 
(2.56)
 *** 
0.13 
(3.76)
 *** 
0.08 
(4.56)
 *** 
0.13 
(6.46)
 *** 
0.07 
(4.17)
 *** 
0.11 
(6.16)
 *** 
DPRIVdev  0.54 
(11.38)
 *** 
0.38 
(6.60)
 *** 
0.54 
(11.52)
 *** 
0.38 
(6.65)
 *** 
0.56 
(9.26)
 *** 
0.42 
(3.76)
 *** 
0.56 
(14.88)
 *** 
0.42 
(9.67)
 *** 
0.55 
(15.15)
 *** 
0.39 
(9.81)
 *** 
PRIMARYinter  1.68 
(3.88)
 *** 
1.37 
(2.43)
 ** 
               
AGRIinter      2.91 
(7.29)
 *** 
2.22 
(3.73)
 *** 
2.72 
(7.57)
 *** 
2.15 
(4.21)
 *** 
2.72 
(5.60)
 *** 
2.15 
(3.92)
 *** 
2.65 
(5.60)
 *** 
2.01 
(3.85)
 *** 
ENERGYinter      0.12 
(0.17) 
0.37 
(0.38) 
           
CAPITALinter  1.47 
(1.67)
 * 
1.23 
(1.06) 
0.64 
(0.73) 
0.58 
(0.48) 
           
WAGESHAREinter          1.49 
(2.24)
 *** 
2.39 
(2.55)
 *** 
1.49 
(2.86)
 *** 
2.39 
(4.11)
 *** 
1.56 
(3.05)
 *** 
2.48 
(4.43)
 *** 
MANINPinter  0.26 
(0.73) 
1.50 
(2.27)
 ** 
-0.04 
(-0.11) 
1.28 
(1.89)
 * 
-0.43 
(-1.34) 
-0.73 
(-1.84)
 * 
-0.43 
(-0.99) 
-0.73 
(-1.50) 
-0.39 
(-0.92) 
-0.62 
(-1.33) 
Adjusted R
2  0.33  0.17  0.36  0.18  0.37  0.27  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
No. Obs.  627  627  627  627  555  555  555  555  555  555 
***/**/*: statistically significant at 1/5/10% level. 
1 White-adjusted t statistics in brackets. 
2 Years defined as panels. Beck and Katz (1995) adjusted z statistics in brackets.  
3 Years defined as panels. Observations are assumed to be heteroskedastic across panels, but uncorrelated across panels and non-autocorrelated within panels. z statistics in brackets.    
 
TABLE 3: Demand Deviations, Supply-Side Locational Determinants and Specialisation in Production: Industry Runs 
  (dependent variable = VAdev, 35 observations) 
 
Regressors: 
NACE code: Industry 
DPRIVdev  DGOVdev  GOVBIAS  GOVBIAS* 
DGOVdev 
AGRIabund  ENERGYabund  CAPITALabund  MANINPabund 
  OLS 
coeff. 
Beta 
coeff. 
OLS 
coeff. 
Beta 
coeff. 
OLS 
coeff. 
Beta 
coeff. 
OLS 
coeff. 
Beta 
coeff. 
OLS 
coeff. 
Beta 
coeff. 
OLS 
coeff. 
Beta 
coeff. 
OLS 
coeff. 
Beta 
coeff. 
OLS 
coeff. 
Beta 
coeff. 
1170: Chemicals  -0.08  0.27  -0.01  -0.06  0.16  0.25  4.59  0.45  0.24  0.28  -0.06  -0.07  0.31  0.33  0.001  0.002 
1190: Metal goods  0.09  0.14  0.14  0.49  0.13  0.10  0.38  0.02  -0.21  -0.15  -0.30  -0.19  0.26  0.17  -0.04  -0.08 
1210: Machinery  0.22  0.53  -0.06  -0.14  -0.07  -0.02  8.76  0.22  -0.69  -0.31  0.23  0.10  -0.40  -0.16  0.21  0.23 
1230: Office machines  0.70  0.98  0.02  0.03  -0.04  -0.02  -2.37  -0.15  -0.44  -0.16  0.08  0.03  -0.35  -0.11  0.05  0.04 
1250: Electrical goods  -0.13  -0.12  -0.11  -0.31  0.10  0.07  0.80  0.05  0.41  0.22  0.47  0.23  -0.10  -0.05  0.60  0.80 
1270: Motor vehicles  0.10  0.05  0.46  0.88  -0.11  -0.04  -1.18  -0.04  -0.69  -0.22  0.60  0.19  -0.86  -0.25  0.14  0.11 
1290: Other transp. eq.  0.14  0.11  0.49  0.69  -0.06  -0.01  3.92  0.17  0.69  0.14  0.24  0.05  -0.15  -0.03  -0.13  -0.07 
1310: Meat products  0.11  0.10  0.06  0.09  0.19  0.12  0.66  0.02  1.33  0.66  -0.41  -0.20  1.36  0.68  0.09  0.12 
1330: Dairy products  1.76  0.74  0.08  0.05  0.76  0.21  1.71  0.03  1.40  0.30  0.54  0.12  0.18  0.04  0.18  0.09 
1350: Other food  0.91  0.23  0.22  0.33  0.68  0.37  2.24  0.08  1.14  0.48  0.32  0.14  -0.004  -0.002  -0.22  -0.23 
1370: Beverages  -0.02  -0.05  -0.22  -0.75  -0.02  -0.01  3.26  0.25  0.61  0.32  -0.10  -0.05  0.50  0.26  0.11  0.14 
1390: Tobacco products  -0.04  -0.02  0.11  0.21  -0.31  -0.07  -3.42  -0.17  -1.64  -0.28  0.19  0.03  -1.18  -0.20  -1.23  -0.52 
1410: Textiles, clothing  2.28  0.72  -0.19  -0.23  0.25  0.07  8.43  0.10  -0.27  -0.08  -0.62  -0.16  0.10  0.03  -0.89  -0.63 
1430: Leather, footwear  3.29  0.76  0.002  0.002  0.15  0.03  1.23  0.03  -0.07  -0.01  -0.82  -0.14  0.54  0.09  -0.88  -0.42 
1450: Timber, furniture  0.57  0.48  -0.12  -0.7  -0.30  -0.14  -5.03  -0.31  -0.68  -0.27  -0.70  -0.26  0.12  0.04  -0.57  -0.57 
1470: Pulp, paper, printing  0.11  0.12  -0.16  -0.35  -0.03  -0.02  4.75  0.21  0.48  0.31  0.52  0.30  -0.59  -0.34  0.25  0.39 
1490: Rubber, plastic  0.05  0.11  0.11  0.84  -0.04  -0.04  -0.79  -0.13  -0.45  -0.47  0.08  0.08  -0.22  -0.21  -0.11  -0.29 
1510: Instrum. engineering 
           and other manuf. 
0.46  0.31  0.38  0.08  0.04  0.02  0.37  0.01  0.27  0.07  0.21  0.05  -0.37  -0.09  -0.04  -0.03 
Dark shading: statistical significance at 1% level, light shading: statistical significance at 5% level.    
 
TABLE 4: The Spread Effect: Public Expenditure and the Intensity of Specialisation 
  (Intercept coefficients not reported) 
 
Mean |OUTdev|  Mean |VAdev|   
Model 
 
Notes 
Regressand: 
Regressors: 
OLS/beta coeff. 
(t stat) 
R
2 
No.obs 
OLS/beta coeff. 
(t stat) 
R
2 
No.obs 
I  • All industries 
• Year fixed effects 
DGOV/Absorption  0.06 / 0.23 
(2.74)
*** 
0.09 
72 
0.03 / 0.11 
(1.09) 
0.10 
72 
II  • NACE 290 dropped 
• Year fixed effects 
DGOV/Absorption  -0.17 / -0.26 
(-1.68)
 * 
0.11 
68 
-0.23 / -0.29 
(-2.05)
 *** 
0.19 
68 
III  • NACE 290 dropped 
• Year fixed effects 
DGOV/Total final 
expenditure 
-0.02 / -0.32 
(-2.71)
 *** 
0.14 
68 
-0.03 / -0.34 
(-2.96)
 *** 
0.22 
68 
IV  • 1970 
• NACE 290 dropped 
DGOV/Absorption  -0.02 / -0.34 
(-1.25) 
0.12 
17 
-0.01 / -0.22 
(-0.85) 
0.05 
17 
V  • 1975 
• NACE 290 dropped 
DGOV/Absorption  -0.02 / -0.28 
(-1.26) 
0.08 
17 
-0.03 / -0.34 
(-1.47) 
0.12 
17 
VI  • 1980 
• NACE 290 dropped 
DGOV/Absorption  -0.02 / -0.29 
(-1.28) 
0.08 
17 
-0.03 / -0.37 
(-1.63) 
0.14 
17 
VII  • 1985 
• NACE 290 dropped 
DGOV/Absorption  -0.04 / -0.38 
(-1.49) 
0.14 
17 
-0.05 / -0.45 
(-1.79)
 * 
0.20 
17 
***/**/*: statistically significant at 1/5/10% level. 
    
 
FIGURE 2: The Pull Effect: Public Expenditure and Industry Specialisation in Output Terms 
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FIGURE 3: The Pull Effect Public Expenditure and Industry Specialisation in Value Added Terms 
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FIGURE 4: The Spread Effect: Public Expenditure and Industry Specialisation in Output Terms: All Industries 
  (NACE codes; public expenditure in mn DM (1970/75) and in mn ECU (1980/85)) 
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FIGURE 5: The Spread Effect: Public Expenditure and Industry Specialisation in Output Terms: NACE 290 Dropped 
  (NACE codes) 
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FIGURE 6: The Spread Effect: Public Expenditure and Industry Specialisation in Value Added Terms: NACE 290 Dropped 
  (NACE codes) 
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410
390
230
310 330
490
250
450
270
170
490
270
490 490
450 450
310
510
170
350
330
510 510 510
350
190
370
390
170 170
230 230
190
230
330   
 
APPENDIX TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Country  Year  Share of private 
final demand in 
manufacturing 
output 
Share of public 
final demand in 
manufacturing 
output 
Sector of 
strongest 
specialisation
1 
Sector of 
weakest 
specialisation
1 
70  0.349  0.020 
75  0.338  0.019 
 
Belgium 
80  0.344  0.021 
Instrument 
engineering & 
other manuf. 
 
Machinery 
70  0.273  0.040 
75  0.274  0.046 
80  0.273  0.041 
 
West Germany 
85  0.252  0.041 
 
Motor vehicles 
 
Tobacco 
products 
70  0.385  0.041 
75  0.356  0.044 
80  0.324  0.047 
 
Denmark 
85  0.321  0.040 
 
Meat products 
 
Motor vehicles 
75  0.425  0.013 
80  0.378  0.024 
 
Spain 
85  0.370  0.030 
Leather, 
footwear 
 
Machinery 
70  0.330  0.029 
75  0.334  0.030 
80  0.328  0.028 
 
France 
85  0.325  0.040 
 
Other transport 
equipment 
 
Tobacco 
products 
70  0.379  0.013 
75  0.344  0.019 
80  0.314  0.017 
 
Italy 
85  0.300  0.024 
 
Leather, 
footwear 
 
Tobacco 
products 
70  0.354  0.023 
75  0.337  0.018 
80  0.325  0.025 
 
Netherlands 
85  0.271  0.029 
 
Tobacco 
products 
 
Office machines 
Portugal  80  0.331  0.016  Textiles, 
clothing  Machinery 
70  0.347  0.050 
75  0.289  0.049 
80  0.275  0.066 
 
U.K. 
85  0.284  0.076 
 
Tobacco 
products 
 
Leather, 
footwear 
70  0.552  0.011 
75  0.464  0.019 
 
Ireland 
85  0.363  0.019 
Office machines Motor vehicles 
Luxemburg  70  0.616  0.013  Rubber, plastic  Office machines 
70  0.398  0.027 
75  0.351  0.029 
80  0.321  0.032 
 
Sample 
Average 
85  0.311  0.037 
 
(n.a.) 
 
(n.a.) 
1 calculated on the basis of value added data (VAdev) in most recent available sample year.    
 
APPENDIX TABLE 2: Correlations 
 
  VAdev  Ddev  DGOVdev  DPRIVdev  DBIAS  PRIMARYinter  AGRIinter  ENERGYinter  CAPITALinter  WAGESHAREinter  MANINPinter 
OUTdev  0.77
*  0.61
*  0.20
*  0.54
*  0.05  0.13
*  0.21
*  0.02  0.12
*  0.24
*  0.05 
MANINPinter  0.12
*  0.04  -0.01  0.02  0.06  0.07  0.18
*  0.01  0.13
*  0.10   
WAGESHAREinter  0.24
*  0.17
*  -0.04  0.17
*  0.09  0.29
*  0.33
*  -0.07  0.19
*     
CAPITALinter  0.10  0.12
*  0.09  0.08  0.03  -0.002  0.18
*  0.15
*       
ENERGYinter  0.02  0.01  0.01  -0.003  0.13
*  -0.05  0.08         
AGRIinter  0.16
*  0.05  -0.003  0.01  0.02  0.65
*           
PRIMARYinter  0.10  0.02  -0.02  0.02  -0.05             
GOVBIAS  0.09  -0.04  0.08                 
DPRIVdev  0.35
*  0.75
*  0.09                 
DGOVdev  0.20
*  0.40
*                   
Ddev  0.42
*                     
 
* : statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
 